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FIRST POSSESSION VERSUS OPTIMAL
TIMING: LIMITING THE DISSIPATION
OF ECONOMIC VALUE
DAVID D. HADDOCK*
Richard Epstein's paper' addresses a number of interesting and impor-
tant ways that time is woven into the law. One way is through a rule of
first possession,2 whereby priority of possession establishes priority of
legal title. Epstein notes many apparently attractive features of first pos-
session, but one can argue that the attractions are illusory. In this paper
I address the doctrine's flaws.
As Epstein remarks, priority appears to have the appealing property of
uni-dimensionality; it anoints a unique owner for each entitlement ac-
cording to who got to it first, setting aside the relatively rare tied races.3
But any uni-dimensional rule will facilitate uniquely defined ownership,
and as a positive, predictive matter other candidates seem stronger than
the doctrine of first possession. For example, a rule of mightiest posses-
sion is uni-dimensional; empirically it is much more important than first
possession, considering all regions and epochs of this world. When the
Normans invaded England they knew but did not care that the Saxons
were there first. Nor did the Saxons care that the Britons had been there
even earlier, and so on into the mists of prehistory. True, naked might
requires resources to threaten, if not actually to assault, competitors.4
But first possession also requires coercion to prevent violations; it is in
effect a civilized form of mightiest possession.
Moreover, first possession is flawed even as a normative (efficiency)
* Associate Professor of Economics, Emory University. B.A. 1966, Oklahoma State Univer-
sity; Ph.D. 1980, University of Chicago. My work has benefited from the comments of Armen
Alchian, Peter Aranson, Yoram Barzel, Marty DeBoer, D. Bruce Johnsen, Gary Libecap, Fred
McChesney, Jonathan Macey, Thomas Merrill, Roberta Romano, Menahem Spiegel, and the mem-
bers of the economics seminar at Emory University.
1. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH.
U.L.Q. 667 (1986).
2. Epstein, supra note 1, at 669-74.
3. Epstein, supra note I, at 670.
4. See Umbeck, Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of
Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 8 (1981), and Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of
Law: A Historical Case, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1979). Both authors argue that such resources serve
to threaten harm, but rarely inflict it. Of course, that does not imply that the behavior is not costly.
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construct when the assumptions of the model are relaxed a bit. Even if
violence is suppressed, costly competition will occur in more subtle ways
whenever first possession yields economic rents. Consider patent and
copyright, where profitable first possession encourages encroachment; or
successful new medications followed closely by other medications, "inno-
vated" at some cost, that differ in arguably trivial ways from the original;
or successful new themes in film, literature, or music that raise a plethora
of imitators. In a model that I discuss below, the cost of the these other
forms of competition will match the cost of the competitive threats of
violence that has been replaced.
Occasionally the simplest versions of either first possession or mighti-
est possession will be appropriate for a society interested in its own wel-
fare. In the vast majority of instances, however, some other model will
be preferable. The interesting issues as they relate to Epstein's paper in-
volve sorting out the instances when a doctrine of first possession makes
sense, and when it does not, asking what modifications may be appropri-
ate. Barzel5 has discussed very plausible instances in which first posses-
sion not only fails to be the best, but will, in fact, lead to the total
dissipation of the value of newly useful resources. Mortensen,6 and Das-
gupta and Stiglitz7 have furnished more general models, but in their
models first possession also seems rarely to be best, even in the face of the
information and transactions costs with which the real world must cope.
I rely heavily on the Barzel model in rejecting Epstein's strong pre-
sumption in favor of first possession. I do not try to outline a fully gen-
eral argument, but instead offer what I believe is sufficient evidence to
cause one to doubt Epstein's position. I also mention one particularly
important complication of the real world, partial information, that does
support the modified version of first possession implicit in patents, copy-
rights, and related branches of law. But even here, the doctrine is se-
verely, and appropriately, constrained by time limits during which rights
can be enforced.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PREMATURE OCCUPATION
Securing possession of an entitlement is costly, and the resources ex-
5. Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REv. ECON. & STATISTICs 348 (1968).
6. Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing and Related Games, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 968 (1982).
7. Dasgupta and Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J.
ECON. 1 (1980).
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pended in this process have alternative uses, so premature possession is
undesirable. Awarding entitlements by first possession leads to just such
premature expenditures. It does not matter whether the entitlement is a
"free" student ticket to a college football game, which (if the team is
popular) induces wasteful pre-dawn occupation of places in line at the
ticket office; a patent or copyright; a "free" farm on the frontier; a legal
monopoly over the provision of cable television services; or lobsters taken
from the sea. The anticipation of capturing property of future value in-
duces abandonment of alternative pursuits of positive current
productivity.
There are policies that curtail premature occupation, although it is not
obvious how often they are used with such a purpose explicitly in mind.
For example, the sovereign can claim title to all unoccupied lands
(mightiest possession), and then sell plots to "speculators." Neglecting
the international competition for the sovereign's title, such a policy as-
sures that the plots reach their highest valued uses. This policy was in
fact utilized in the United States to distribute much of its interior land,
although "squatters" sometimes were able to obtain ex post political
awards based on first possession. Legally, the interior was unowned sim-
ply because earlier first possessors, the American Indians, were not rec-
ognized as legal owners. First possession presupposes standing to call on
the enforcement powers of the law, so again, as a practical matter, an
effective coercive legal authority (mightiest possession) is a prerequisite
for a rule of first possession. The Indians did not have mightiest posses-
sion, so ipso facto they could not support their claims by first possession
either. Because we must have coercive legal authority, the issue is when
do we also want to rely on a doctrine of first possession. There is a
choice of doctrine available once mightiest possession is established.
A benevolent legal authority that was powerful enough to police its
assignments of entitlements, and one that also knew everything that ulti-
mately would have positive value, could today assign title to each asset
and later avoid the resource drain that comes from individuals trying to
establish title. But comprehensive benevolence, power and knowledge do
not characterize human institutions. Unowned and formerly worthless
items (the deep-sea floor) or previously unknown ones (the electromag-
netic spectrum) later become attractive assets. If there are no restraints,
a rent-seeking race to establish title ensues. At the margin, expenditures
to capture title will equal the value of the asset whose title is sought, so
Number 3]
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marginal rents are completely dissipated.' Those rules of the race that
lead to marginal rent exhaustion with the smallest total expenditure on
the race itself are the rules that will maximize the inframarginal rents.
Epstein does not ignore such problems, but rather underestimates
them. "The first possession rule does give rise to serious problems in the
case of common-pool assets, such as oil, gas and fish. Yet even here it
furnishes a baseline of entitlements which permits the state to organize
forced exchanges that on average work to the long-term advantage of
persons with interests in the pool."9 But whenever any asset is (1) valua-
ble, (2) unclaimed, and (3) available to the first possessor, then it is a
common-pool asset-that is the definition. The more narrowly defined
subset Epstein seems to have in mind, so-called "migratory resources," is
only one part of a larger and more general common-pool problem.
The lynchpin is a measurement problem-the definability of a resource
before it is ready to be exploited. Some resources have insufficient value
today to tempt anyone to bear the present costs of establishing and en-
forcing title, but are recognized to be of increasing value in a growing
economy. At the end of World War II nobody owned the floor of the
North Sea, but today it is one of the world's most active oil fields. No
one owns the Moon's surface today, but it will not surprise me if com-
mercial mining occurs there within my lifetime. Such resources are de-
finable, and for them first possession is a particularly wasteful means of
establishing title when compared to alternatives. Not surprisingly, title
by first possession is rarely recognized in such instances.
However, other resources cannot even be described at present, for ex-
ample, many of the next decade's most significant patentable inventions,
and as to these resources some of the alternatives to first possession may
be unworkable. But two points are crucial: First, before first possession
is judged to be an appropriate rule, the sort of informational failing that I
have described must be present. Second, even when first possession is an
appropriate rule, it will generally be constrained, often by legal limita-
tions on the life of the entitlement.
Notice that I am not saying that first possession should be rejected
retrospectively. If today's title is well-defined, there are strong efficiency
grounds for enforcing that title however it was established. Only then
8. See Barzel, supra note 5, and Cheung, A Theory of Price Control, 17 J. L. & ECON. 53
(1974). Barzel, A Theory of Rationing by Waiting, 17 J. L. & ECON. 73 (1974), while narrower in
focus, also is to the point.
9. Epstein, supra note 1, at 670.
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can useful further investment be carried to the proper margin. Conse-
quently, strong countervailing arguments are required before an efficient
legal system should overturn long-recognized titles. This is true even if
the original entitlement was established in a wasteful manner; the wasted
resources are sunk; they now represent no foregone opportunity. In-
stead, I am considering the problem of establishing entitlements to the
flow of newly valuable assets.
II. RETURNS AND CAPTURE COSTS: THE THEORY
In one way, a rule of first possession has analytically distinct impacts
on migratory resources as opposed to resources such as land or ideas.
But in another very important way, the impacts are the same. It is inap-
propriate to limit consideration to the distinctions while ignoring the
similarities.
A. Distinct Impacts: First Possession's Impact on Returns
First possession, in the guise of the law of capture, can damage the
source of migratory assets and reduce its present value. For example,
fractionated ownership of a geological dome containing petroleum cre-
ates private incentives to drill wells too closely and to pump too rapidly,
for only capture establishes title to the petroleum itself.' 0 Drilling fewer
wells would increase the discounted stream of gross recovery from the
field, as would operating each well more leisurely.
Overly avid fishing or trapping also reduces the long-run value of the
pool, both by disrupting breeding patterns and by prematurely interrupt-
ing the growth of individual animals. Such losses sometimes induce soci-
eties that we consider primitive to establish fairly sophisticated property-
rights systems that override a tradition of first possession. Demsetz has
described the evolution of one such system among fur-trapping Indians
in colonial Quebec." I Johnsen argues that wealth transfers implicit in the
peculiar custom of potlatching among the Kwakutil of coastal British
Columbia are one aspect of a property-rights system over a fishing re-
source that, geographically, was unusually variable for climatological
10 Libecap and Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude
Oil Production, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 87 (1984); Libecap and Wiggins, The Influence of Private Con-
tractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization, 93 J. Po. ECON. 690 (1985); and
Wiggin, and Libecap, Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Infor-
mation, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 368 (1985).
11. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 345 (1967).
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reasons. 12
The losses caused by overly rapid depletion of migratory resources are
only part of the picture. Gordon examines the returns-diminution argu-
ment with respect to modern maritime fisheries, but convincingly rejects
it as a major loss. Much more deleterious are the cost consequences of
the rule of capture itself, which is to say, the rule of first possession.
13
The next section shows that the capture costs are analytically the same
for migratory resources as for any other common-pool resource subject
to a rule of first possession.
B. Similar Impacts: First Possession's Impact on Capture Costs
Even if the amount of an unowned asset is fixed, the marginal reward
for capturing a unit will never exceed the opportunity cost of the re-
sources required to capture it. Restraints that seek to optimize the
number of units taken may increase returns from capturing a unit ini-
tially. But if those returns rise above those available elsewhere, addi-
tional resources will be tempted into the race. Because, by assumption,
the additional resources cannot be used to claim more units of the asset
in aggregate, the inputs will be used instead to try to establish claims to
units before competitors can. Hence, additional resource costs are in-
curred in a race to claim a stock of fixed size. Such expenditures will
grow until the marginal rate of return from claiming title has been driven
back to levels available if the resources used for the capture were used
elsewhere.
This unappealing result can be completely avoided only if some entity
simultaneously controls both the rate and the technique of capture,
which is to say only if full ownership is established over the stock. Estab-
lishing ownership is a matter of transforming a resource from its initial
state into one that has measurable legal attributes. The transformation is
costly.
III. THE PREMATURE OCCUPATION MODEL CONTRASTED WITH A
MONOPOLY MODEL
To avoid confusion, I will distinguish the premature occupation model
12. Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakutil
Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1986).
13. Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. PO1.
ECON. 124 (1954).
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discussed here from a single-price monopoly model. Monopoly revenues
exceeding those available elsewhere attract entrants. In that instance, as
in the present one, the entrant's private gains are less than the aggregated
losses imposed on existing firms. Yet we applaud entry in a monopolized
industry because deadweight losses are reduced. The entrant expands
industry output, which drives down price. The losses of the other firms
translate into even larger gains for buyers. But with common-pool as-
sets, entry imposes losses on the entrant's competitors by increasing real
resource costs. There is a real economic loss, not a transfer to others.
Indeed, entry-related costs sometimes actually curtail output, driving
prices up, not down as with entry into a monopolized industry.
Suppose a certain input is used in both a fully competitive industry and
an industry that is monopolized. The total input available is shown
along the horizontal axis of Figure One. The value of the input's margi-
nal product in the monopolized industry, VMP(m), is measured to the
right from o(m). 14 The value of marginal product in the competitive in-
dustry, VMP(c), is measured to the left from 0(c). The value maximizing
division of the input between the industries is at D.
FIGURE ONE: INPUT DISTORTION WITH OUTPUT MONOPOLY
S / INPUT $ INPUT
vMP(m)
aVMP(e)
I I
0(m) e f D 0(c)
INPUT
But a non-price discriminating monopoly takes less than 0(m)D units
of the input, because marginal revenue in the output market is less than
the price. The monopoly's demand for the input is the marginal revenue
14. The value of marginal product is the marginal physical product of the input times the
reservation value of the output to the marginal buyer, and that reservation value will be the market
price of the output in a competitive industry or a non-price-discriminating monopoly.
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product, shown as MRP(m).15 The marginal cost of the input to the
monopolist is the input's opportunity cost in the competitive industry,
because competitors offer the value of marginal product per unit of input.
Consequently, the monopoly uses too little input, O(m)e, and the com-
petitive industry uses too much, O(c)e. If ef units of input are transferred
from the competitive industry to the monopoly, competitive industry
output worth cdef is sacrificed, but monopoly output worth abef is
gained, for a net gain for the economy of abcd. So we applaud.
Figure Two shows the situation under a rule of first possession. Both
industries, call them "Eastern" and "Western," are assumed to be fully
competitive. The curve showing the value of the marginal product of
inputs potentially used in the Western industry is today everywhere be-
low that in the Eastern, so no inputs should be diverted to the West.
However, assume VMP(w) is shifting up and to the left over time. In
order to be the one to capitalize on the shift, some individual is induced
today to divert to the West, say, O(w)k units of input in order to establish
title. The value of foregone Eastern output this period, O(w)ghk, exceeds
the value of this period's new Western output, O(w)kmn, by the cross-
hatched area. This diversion of inputs deserves no applause; all inputs
should remain in the East until a segment of VMP(w) lies above VMP(e).
FIGURE Two: INPUT DISTORTION WITH FIRST POSSESSION$Input S / Input
~VMP(e)
h  g
n
vMP(w) I
o(e) k 0(w)
15. Marginal revenue product is marginal physical product times marginal revenue in the out-
put market. For a non-price-discriminating monopolist, marginal revenue is less than price, which is
still the marginal buyer's reservation value for the output. Although the monopolist receives the
market price for the marginal unit, the price of other units that could have been sold at higher prices
to more eager buyers must be reduced ever further below those buyers' reservation values if more
and more units are to be sold.
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IV. OPTIMAL TIMING: APPLYING THE THEORY TO LAND
It may seem unlikely that the output of a plot of land will be reduced
significantly by a rule of first possession. 6 But that doctrine will increase
the cost of establishing title. In brief, the rule causes withdrawal of re-
sources from alternative pursuits too soon. The issue is timing.
Timing is also a concern when modeling innovation and the sometimes
valuable patents and copyrights that follow. Recognition that the analyt-
ical problems are the same suggests that models of innovation are also
applicable to first possession of other assets. Yoram Barzel has presented
a sophisticated discussion of the timing of innovations.17 With minor
changes in vocabulary, Barzel's analysis is directly applicable to re-
sources other than knowledge.
Consider a group of Eastern farmers eyeing an unoccupied plot of
Western land that is adequate for one farm. Assume that the Western
population is gradually growing, so the value of the output of a potential
Western farm is increasing from year to year. To take up a new farm
requires an investment by the farmer, and those resources have alterna-
tive uses on Eastern farms. Suppose the resources are worth 200 per year
if used on an Eastern farm. On a new Western farm, the same resources
would be worth 200 in year t, but that yearly return is increasing by ten
per year.'I Barzel's Table One, slightly altered here, illustrates the situa-
tion described. The time path that maximizes returns from aggregate
investment leaves the Western farm unoccupied until year t. Then some
of the resources are withdrawn from the East, where they realize a return
of 200 per year, and are reinvested in the West, where they realize a
higher return every year after t.
But a different result will be realized under a rule of first possession.
The return on a Western investment will exceed the market return after
t, which means that by t other farmers will already possess the Western
plot. To move West in t-1 will entail a lower output, 200 to 190, but at a
rate of discount of, say ten percent, any farmer will gladly sacrifice ten
units in t-1 to obtain the land and its surplus from t-+ 1 onward. But that
16. Notice, however, that the slash-and-burn agriculture of some tropical economies may cycle
more rapidly than would maximize aggregate output, because title to fallow but previously farmed
tracts that presently are regaining fertility is captured through first (re)possession.
17. Barzel, supra note 5.
18. If the value of the potential Western farms is not increasing relative to Eastern ones, the
Western farms either will be occupied already if that constant value exceeds 200, or will never be
occupied if the value is less than 200.
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TABLE ONE: EARNING STREAMS FROM THREE ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENT POLICIES
YEAR
- t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-I t t+l t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
POLICY
Establish
Western - 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250
Farm
Immediately
Retain
Eastern - 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Farm
Indefinitely
Best - 200 200 200 200 200 200 210 220 230 240 250
Combination
Eastern Farm - t - Western Farm -
farmer should also be willing to sacrifice twenty units in t-2 for the land,
knowing that it will be occupied in t-1, and so on. Indeed, at a ten per-
cent rate of discount the Western land will be occupied in t-10, at which
date the discounted value of aggregated losses from t-10 to t just equals
the discounted value of the surplus from t to infinity. Hence, the entire
value of the potential surplus will be dissipated by competition for prop-
erty rights.
Epstein remarks, "first possession ... can encourage the premature
acquisition of interests, but that cost is tolerable in light of the alterna-
tives."' 9 That implies that a dissipation of the entire benefit of bringing
additional land into the economy is tolerable. As I show shortly, land is
a good example of a situation with better alternatives. Land rarely dis-
plays the attributes that make a (modified) rule of first possession
attractive.
Barzel illustrates his discussion with a figure similar to Figure Three.
The line here labeled R(w) represents the flow of discounted returns
through time arising from an investment in the Western farm. R(e) rep-
19. Epstein, supra note 1, at 672.
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resents the flow of returns from the best alternative use of those re-
sources, here assumed to be on an Eastern farm.20 The value of Western
produce grows from year to year, so R(w) does not decline as rapidly as
R(e) even though they are discounted at the same rate. Resources should
be shifted from East to West at t(m) if the returns are to be maximized,
But the possessor gets the surplus after t(m) as shown by the cross-
hatched area. That surplus attracts premature interregional reinvest-
ment at some time such as t(z), where discounted losses between t(z) and
t(m) equal the discounted surplus after t(m).
FIGURE THREE: OPTIMAL REINVESTMENT VERSUS FIRST
POSSESSION
R
R(w
I I
I I
t(z) t(m)
What a discouraging outcome. Fortunately, there are several alterna-
tives that are more attractive than the doctrine of first possession.
A. Differential Taxes
One obvious possibility is to impose higher taxes on Western farms.
With a tax rate increasing precisely at the rate of increase of the value of
Western produce, the cross-hatched area in Figure Three will go to the
treasury, not to the first possessor. There remains no incentive to occupy
the Western farm prior to t(m).
20. R(e) is downward sloping because it represents a constant flow of returns disdounted ever
further into the future. R(w) will be downward sloping if the rate of growth of Western returns is
less than the rate of discount. If R(w) was not downward sloping, the Western !and would already
be occupied and the issue of entitlement resolved, because the Western land would then be of infinite
present value.
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Such a "solution" may be obvious, but it is not particularly attractive.
One difficulty is that it requires detailed information collected solely for
the purposes of calibrating the taxes. Otherwise, productive investments
by farmers will be discouraged because returns from such investments
cannot easily be disentangled from differential growth between the re-
gions. Information is costly, which offsets the savings in the capture
costs obtained by imposing the tax. Moreover, costly information makes
it unlikely that members of the general public will be able to monitor the
taxing officials closely, so slovenly administration or more overt abuse
may be a problem. Fortunately, there are superior alternatives.
B. Sovereign's Title with Auctions
Another solution to the common-pool problem, one that has more or
less been adopted for mineral rights on the continental shelf of the
United States, is for the sovereign to usurp title, and then auction it off as
the assets become economically usable. Competing bidders drive the
price to the present discounted value of the expected surplus, eliminating
any private incentive to invest prematurely in exploitation.2"
Moreover, individuals are encouraged to use private knowledge, just as
they are with a rule of first possession. Suppose that Figure Three repre-
sents general beliefs, but that some individual knows the plot of Western
land is worth more. This is illustrated in Figure 4. R(g) represents gen-
eral expectations, R(k) represents the knowledgeable individual's expec-
tations, and R(a) represents the discounted flow of returns from
alternative investments. Clearly, the knowledgeable individual will wish
to exploit the asset earlier than will the ignorant individuals, at t(k)
rather than t(g), and the aggregated returns to the economy will be en-
hanced if he does so. Assuming there are no strategic complications,
and that bidding is opened by t(k), the knowledgeable individual will be
able to use the site appropriately, because he will outbid competitors.
21. Of course, to the extent that the ability to usurp title over common-pool resources increases
a national sovereign's wealth, that will entice other national sovereigns to compete to be the one to
usurp title. This will increase the dissipation of wealth on an international basis. Usurpable titles
are a common-pool on a grander scale, and there mightiest possession still determines entitlement.
[Vol. 64:775
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FIGURE FOUR: REINVESTMENT WITH DIVERSE EXPECTATIONS
$
R(a)
~R(k)
t(zz) t(z) t(k) t(g) TiME
With a rule of first possession, however, the knowledgeable individual
must occupy the site before t(z), because that is when other individuals
will foresee a normal rate of return over the life of the entitlement.
Although t(z) may sometimes be later than t(k), that will be a happen-
stance that requires that the second-best informed party does not have
even a ballpark notion of the true value of the plot. A knowledgeable but
risk-averse individual, who knows his own expectations but not those of
every other member of society (a likely scenario), may occupy the site at
t(zz), when its private rate of return as estimated from his private infor-
mation equals that elsewhere. Otherwise, he cannot be sure that another
individual will not deprive him of the opportunity to claim an asset with
a normal rate of return. By this process, however, we see once again that
the entire net increase in the potential wealth of the economy may be
dissipated by premature occupation.22
C. Temporally Limited Title
An auction worked in the above example because the asset was well-
defined, which is crucial to understanding why a constrained doctrine of
first possession is sometimes used despite its otherwise obvious failings.
An auction requires defining what is being exchanged but prior definition
is not always practical. For example, how could the right to develop and
exploit the electromagnetic spectrum have been assigned in the 1700's
before its existence was even imagined? Clearly, when an asset cannot be
22. See French and McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition, 57 J.
Bus. 417 (1984) for a discussion of the privately optimal moment for an individual to strike when he
does not know whether or not his knowledge is superior to that of competitors.
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defined in advance, the first person to identify, define, and possess it, will
reap a windfall. The ensuing race for knowledge will dissipate the value
on an expectational basis, just as a race dissipated the value of our hypo-
thetical Western farm.
This is the innovation problem, and it concerns the creation of knowl-
edge, not things known to exist and to be evolving toward positive net
economic value. Yet even for innovations a part of the value can be
saved. In modern patent and copyright systems entitlements are claimed
by first possession, but they are of limited duration. Figure Five illus-
trates the impact. As the part of the cross-hatched area that accrues to
the innovator is reduced, for example to the portion from t(m) to t(p)
rather than that from t(m) to infinity, the willingness to absorb losses
prior to t(m) in order to establish a claim is also reduced. The date of
innovation is moved from t(z) toward t(m), in the present instance to t(i).
The private and social losses between t(i) and t(m) match the private
rewards from t(m) to t(p), which, of course, fall short of the social bene-
-fits aggregated from t(m) to infinity.
FIGURE FIVE: REINVESTMENT WITH NONPERPETUAL FIRST
POSSESSION
R(i)
RR~a)
I I I
t(z) t(i) t(m) t(p) TIME
Does this mean that the appropriate life of the entitlement is zero,
which would seem to drive the innovation date right to t(m)? To see why
this is incorrect requires making explicit one factor that is implicit in the
Barzel model. This is the task of the next section.
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V. COSTLY KNOWLEDGE
Suppose a foolish Fifteenth Century European monarch had declared
(a) that all lands discovered in the future would be taxed so highly they
would be no more attractive than presently known lands, or (b) that the
lands, although unknown, already belonged to the sovereign and would
be auctioned to the highest bidder following discovery, or (c) that the
new lands would be the discoverer's for a duration of zero, and then
would be public domain. Clearly efforts by that sovereign's subjects to
discover lands would have been scanty. This seems to imply that none of
the above suggested solutions to the common-pool problem would have
proven adequate.
But that does not argue for an unbounded rule of first possession of
land. The problem arose because the land was unknown, not because it
was unowned. Moreover, the land may have been defined well enough
for a more appropriate response by a sufficiently powerful and trustwor-
thy monarch, who could have auctioned title prior to discovery. Would-
be explorers could have bought discovery rights to be exploited whenever
it seemed appropriate. Land is simply not that ephemeral. The pace of
exploration would not have been inefficiently rapid, given the distribution
of expectations.
Clearly some problems can arise with new entitlements to land. After
all, it was not widely believed in 1400 that a discovery right to all new
lands west of Spain was in fundamental conflict with a right to all new
lands east of Spain. Nor was it recognized how important a claim's
dimensions above and below the surface would become. But as Epstein
notes, "No legal rule can solve all borderline cases where individuals act
in ignorance ... "'
These are problems of development of knowledge, not of occupation of
land. It is immaterial whether this knowledge is attached to land or is
instead embodied in another tangible or intangible object. But where
new knowledge is at issue, finding appropriate solutions becomes more
complex. In such situations, one cannot define an entitlement because
one cannot imagine what one has not imagined. With something as
ephemeral as knowledge, it is often necessary to resort to a limited, but
not unbounded, rule of first possession.
There are two distinct problems: (1) how to award title to one of the
many hopeful claimants, and (2) how to know that something is there to
23. Epstein, supra note 1, at 671.
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be claimed in the first place. A rule of first possession has some appeal
when one focuses only on incentives for resolving the second problem, if
only because it is hard to conceive of an alternative. But first possession
is an unappealing solution to the first problem. Because the technique
for awarding entitlement must cope with both problems, the solution se-
lected ordinarily will be a compromise. One should strive to understand
the nature of the compromise, however, not to ignore a large part of the
problem.
There is an appropriate time to search, and an appropriate way. Even
if the search is efficient it will be costly. Moreover, even after the outlines
of the discovery are defined, exploitation may require a long period of
costly further development, which should be undertaken in a timely and
coordinated fashion. Kitch argues that the details of modern American
patent law facilitates such coordinated development of initially ephem-
eral ideas.24 He calls those provisions the "prospect function" of patents.
But Kitch does not explain why the initial idea is not covered by a
permanent patent-an unbounded rule of first possession. After all,
proper development of some ideas takes a very long time indeed. Per-
haps Kitch believes, as do I, that Barzel has answered that problem.25
Kitch merely notes that once the boundaries of a new idea have been
vaguely defined, an entitlement should vest. That halts further costly
competition for that entitlement, and facilitates timely propagation of
relevant knowledge to dispersed researchers. Although Kitch does not
raise the question of how vague is too vague, the answer presumably is a
function of measurement costs, and will fluctuate over time with the sys-
tem's ability to distinguish spurious rent-seeking claims from those aris-
ing from actual investment and discovery.
If innovation is costly even at an efficient pace, then the innovator
must expect a reward for success or he will not incur the cost. Kitch
terms this the "reward function" of patents. An ideal life of a patent for
a proper reward is not infinite, but will permit efficient final development
plus a period of exclusive entitlement just adequate to generate a compet-
itive return on all the pre- and post-patent research, providing that re-
search was conducted at the proper time, at the proper pace, and using
the proper techniques.26 Such a duration would remove incentives to
24. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & EcoN. 265 (1977).
25. Barzel, supra note 5. See also Mortensen, supra note 6. and Dasgupta and Stiglitz, supra
note 7.
26. Because many individuals may undertake initial research, whereas only one receives a pat-
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perform research too rapidly or too early.
But now reality intrudes. Many research costs are poorly quantifiable
and highly variable across projects. The same is true of the social value
of innovations. Consequently, it is unlikely that our present uniform sev-
enteen-year patent life is ideal in the sense that the word was used above.
But although that patent life is not ideal, except perhaps in light of the
overwhelming informational burden implied by the ultimate ideal, an in-
finite patent life is assuredly not ideal either. Infinite duration induces
total dissipation of the innovation's value. Even for innovations, first
possession is, and should be, constrained. If boundary definition is not
an issue, the doctrine is inferior in any of its forms to alternative methods
of bringing assets into the economy.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have argued that a prospective rule of first possession has little to
recommend it, at least as a rule providing that new entitlements hence-
forth run in perpetuity to the first party to occupy a property, broadly
defined. There are two distinct circumstances in which valuable assets
are unowned. First, items previously known, but of no value, acquire
value when the economy changes. A rule of first possession in this con-
text induces premature occupation, with returns foregone elsewhere that
equal the discounted present value of the returns from the newly ac-
quired asset. In effect, the rule of first possession dissipates the asset's
entire net worth.
This accords with the circumstances during the period of occupation
of the American continents by European immigrants. Alternatives supe-
rior to first possession existed and were used. Commonly, the sovereign
claimed title prior to settlement, then sold or bartered the land to settlers
or intermediaries. 7 That technique had long been used to expand the
ent. the ideal return will yield a competitive risk-adjusted expected return on research investments
aggregated over all researchers. Consequently, the ultimate patent owner may realize a bonanza,
while unsuccessful researchers suffer losses. Regardless of the patent life selected, resources will
move into or out of innovative activities so that such conditions will obtain at the margin.
27. For example, the United States government bartered a great deal of Western land to rail-
road companies in exchange for new rail construction. The new trackage would not have been
profitable without the land grants, and much of the land was worthless without a source of transpor-
tation Due to the new construction, both the railroad companies and the government were able to
sell off land that otherwise would have lain idle for some time. There were occasional aberrations.
but little of the land was given away through a rule of first possession. Although the prices charged
for the government land may strike modern scholars as a ridiculously low token fee, deflating those
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European homelands whenever the sovereign was strong enough to en-
force such claims. Abuses can arise when such authority is seized by a
sovereign, but usually that dissipates only part of an asset's value-legis-
lators and kings have a private incentive to maximize the net value of the
realm they govern; it is their tax base.
A second circumstance where one finds valuable unowned assets con-
cerns innovation, which compounds the difficulty of efficiently establish-
ing entitlements. The asset cannot be well-defined soon enough to avoid
all capture costs while still retaining individual incentives to finance re-
search. In these circumstances, a modified rule of first possession is
sometimes adopted because alternatives are unworkable. Although such
circumstances occasionally apply to unoccupied land, this is the excep-
tion rather than the rule.
Finally, regardless of any efficiency aspects it may or may not have, a
rule of first possession is an inadequate positive basis for a theory of law.
Mightiest possession explains more that has happened and more that has
become law than does first possession. Mightiest possession may well be
efficient (though not necessarily equitable) due to the sovereign's incen-
tive to maximize the value of his realm and thus his tax base. In con-
trast, an unconstrained rule of first possession is a rule of stagnation.
Now that mankind is contemplating mining Antarctica and the deep-
sea floor, the prospective aspects of a doctrine of first possession are very
modern issues.
prices by a price index or contrasting them with other land prices of the day makes them seem more
reasonable.
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